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Investment Banking Conflicts:
Research Analysts and IPO Allocations
As investors sobered up from the "irrational exuberance"
of the tech stock bubble, a critical eye turned to securities industry
practices.' In hindsight, few people could understand what pushed
the markets so high when the tech stocks that lead the charge had
nothing to show in the way of profits.2 The answer seemed to be
that research analysts consistently were bullish on many stocks and
remained so even as the bubble burst and the market price of
many of those same stocks plunged.3 What explains the analysts'
behavior?
Some charge that research analysts of the major investment
banking firms created the stock boom by hyping the stock of
companies for which their investment banks had provided or were
seeking to provide investment banking services.4 The companies
benefited because their stock price rose.5 In exchange, the banks
benefited when they received large investment banking fees for
services provided to those companies.6 The alleged effect was that
1. Alan Greenspan, The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society,
Speech at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of the American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research (Dec. 5, 1996), 1996 WL 698100 (F.R.B.);
Randall Smith & Aaron Lucchetti, How Spitzer Pact Will Affect of Wall Street, WALL
ST. J., May 22, 2002, at C1.
2. See generally Charles Gasparino, Merrill Lynch to Pay Big Fine, Increase
Oversight of Analysts, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2002, at Al (stating that many investors
say they relied on the calls of bullish Wall Street analysts before the bursting of the
tech-stock bubble) [hereinafter Gasparino, Merrill Will Pay Fine].
3. Gasparino, Merrill Will Pay Fine, supra note 2.
4. See id; Randall Smith & Geeta Anand, Piper Jaffray is Fined for Research
Threat, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2002, at C1. The securities firm Piper Jaffray "was
fined for allegedly threatening to drop research coverage of a biotech company if it
didn't get a plum assignment to manage a stock offering for the company." Id.
5. See Smith & Anand, supra note 4. The charge was that because Piper
threatened to drop research coverage the company, Antigenetics, suffered during its
stock offering. Id.
6. See generally Charles Gasparino, Spitzer Staff Gathers Salomon E-mails
Criticizing Grubman, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2002, at C1 (reporting that Jack Grubman,
an analyst for Salomon Smith Barney, never disguised his dual role of stock analyst
and investment banking marketer for Salomon) [hereinafter Gasparino, Spitzer
Gathers Emails]; see also Gasparino, Merrill Will Pay Fine, supra note 2 (analysts
roles changed during the last decade to help record large investment banking fees).
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small investors were misled by these optimistic recommendations,
which investors assumed were objective, and then lost out when
the stocks eventually tumbled. In addition, banks doled out initial
public offering (IPO) shares to company executives purportedly in
exchange for prior or continued investment banking business, a
transaction known as spinning.8 Overly optimistic stock analysis
created artificial demand, allowing executives to reap huge profits
during the tech stock boom days of the late 1990s when they sold
those IPO stocks almost immediately. 9
After an investigation by New York's Attorney General,
Eliot Spitzer, Merrill Lynch entered into a $100 million settlement
in May of 2002 that restricted interactions between its research
analysts and bankers.'" Following New York's lead, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved proposed rule
changes for two self-regulatory organizations (SROs), the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE)." Currently, the SEC is considering
7. See Gasparino, Merrill Will Pay Fine, supra note 2; Charles Gasparino,
Susanne Craig & Randall Smith, Salomon Faces Questions on IPO, WALL ST. J., July
10, 2002, at C1.
8. See Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam, Buddy System: How a Technology-
Banking Star Doled Out Shares of Hot IPOs, WALL ST. J., September 23, 2002, at Al
[hereinafter Smith & Pulliam, Buddy System].
9. See id; Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam, How a Star Banker Pressed for IPOs,
WALL ST. J., September 5, 2002, at C1 [hereinafter Smith & Pulliam, Star Banker];
Gasparino, Craig & Smith, supra note 7. The IPO allocations resemble bank tying
arrangements that are expressly prohibited by federal statute. See Tying
Arrangements, 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (2001) (the extension of credit by a bank can not be
tied to the condition that the customer obtain additional credit or a service from the
bank). Touting stock in return for additional investment banking fees is at least
analogous to illegal tying, but illegal tying will not be discussed in this Note, because
it lacks the common element of research analysts.
10. Gasparino, Merrill Will Pay Fine, supra note 2; see also In re New York ex rel.
Spitzer v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., No. 02/401522 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., May 21, 2002)
(stipulation and order of discontinuance of investigation and proceeding against
Merrill Lynch), at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/investors/merrill-agreement.pdf (last
visited Feb. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Merrill Lynch Settlement]. New York will receive
$48 million. Id. $2 million will go the North American Securities Administrators
Association, and the remaining $50 million will go to the States, the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico. Id.
11. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule
Changes by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and the New York
Stock Exchange, Inc. and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval
of Amendment No. 2 to the Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. and Amendment No. 1 to the Proposed Rule Change by the
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additional amendments to the new regulations, which took effect
over a period between July 9, 2002, and November 6, 2002.12 The
approved rules and new proposals look similar to the terms of the
Merrill Lynch settlement, but will affect all members of these
SROs. 13  In September 2002, the NASD fined Citigroup's
investment banking arm, Salomon Smith Barney, $5 million for
improperly hyping the tech stock Winstar.14  Most recently, on
December 20, 2002, leading Wall Street firms entered into a global
pact (GP) agreement with the various regulatory agencies and
state securities regulators that will require the firms to pay a total
of $1.435 billion for penalties, independent research, and investor
education. 5
Though the inquiry into research and banking conflicts was
the center of most regulatory attention, the SROs, SEC, and the
New York Attorney General's office were also seeking to resolve
what they saw as conflicts of interest in the allocation of IPOs.
16
The NASD has proposed rules to eliminate the practice of
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-45908, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,968 (May 10, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-45908.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2003) [hereinafter
SEC Research Conflicts].
12. See Self-Regulatory Organizations: Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule
Changes by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Exchange Rules 344
("Supervisory Analysts"), 345A ("Continuing Education for Registered Persons"),
351 ("Reporting Requirements") and 472 ("Communications with the Public") and
by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Research Analyst
Conflicts of Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47110, 68 Fed. Reg. 826, at 833,
835 (Dec. 31, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-47110.htm (last
visited Feb. 15, 2003) [hereinafter SRO Proposals].
13. See SEC Research Conflicts, 67 Fed. Reg. at 34,969. In addition, in Footnote
11 of the document, the SEC notes that the SRO regulations will only apply to
research reports on equity securities, and not research reports covering debt
securities. Id.
14. See Charles Gasparino, Salomon Agrees to Settle Stock-Hype Case, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 24, 2002, at C1 [hereinafter Gasparino, Salomon Settles Case]. Among other
things, Salomon was fined for misleading statements and omissions regarding Winstar
made by its star analyst Jack Grubman. Id. Grubman and Ms. Gochuico were
charged with setting an unreasonable price target and violating just and equitable
principles of trade. Id.
15. See Randall Smith, Will Investors Benefit from Wall Street's Split?: Regulators
Set Accord With Securities Firms, But Some Issues Persist, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2002,
at C1 [hereinafter Smith, Regulators Set Accord]. A final settlement has not been
reached, as the finer details are still being negotiated. Id.
16. Charles Gasparino, The SEC and Spitzer Might Outlaw 'Spinning' of IPOs,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2002, at CI [hereinafter Gasparino, SEC and Spitzer].
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spinning, and for those firms that entered into the GP, spinning
has been explicitly prohibited. 7
The rules seeking to eliminate the conflicts of interest
between analysts and investment bankers appear as if they will
achieve their purpose: objective analysis on which investors can
rely. But at what cost will this be achieved? Serious questions
remain as to whether or not research can sustain itself and whether
the new regulations are an unnecessary expense. 8 Beyond
disclosure of IPO allocation practices, proposals that restrict the
discretion investment banks have when allocating IPOs will be
unnecessary. Allocating IPOs to good clients is a business
judgment consideration and will remain so unless a new system is
created. 19
Part I of this Note examines the conflicts of interest that
exist between research analysts and their investment banks and
then will review and analyze the newly adopted rules for the
NASD and NYSE.2" Part II of -this Note examines investment
banks' IPO allocation practices and similarly reviews and analyzes
the proposed NASD rule.2'
I. RESEARCH ANALYSTS' CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
A. Recent Practices
The changed role of the research analyst on Wall Street has
precipitated the recent investigation into analysts' conflicts. Just
a decade ago, Wall Street analysts were out of the limelight.2 3 But,
17. See National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Notice to Members 02-55,
Regulation of IPO Allocations and Distributions (proposed Aug. 21, 2002), at
http://www.nasdr.com/pdf-text/0255ntm.pdf (the regulation is to be codified as
NASD Rule 2712 and as an amendment to Rule 2710) (last visited Feb. 15, 2003)
[hereinafter NASD NM 02-55]; Smith, Regulators Set Accord, supra note 15.
18. See Burton G. Malkiel, Remaking the Market: The Great Wall Street?, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 14, 2002, at A16.
19. See generally Alan Murray, Let Capital Markets, Not Financial Firms, Govern
Fate of IPOs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2002, at A4 (Mr. Murry advocates an auction
style IPO distribution process).
20. See infra notes 22-168 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 169-263 and accompanying text.




the increasing competition for underwriting fees during the boom
days of the 1990s brought analysts to the forefront.24 Not only
were analysts assessing stocks but also actively promoting them in
an attempt to win investment banking business for their firms.25
The New York Attorney General's investigation of Merrill Lynch
and Salomon Smith Barney (and in the case of Merrill Lynch,
settlement), provide many of the examples that explicate the
practices allegedly engaged in by a number of Wall Street firms
and analysts.26
1. Merrill Lynch
In an affidavit submitted to the Supreme Court of the State
of New York, assistant New York Attorney General Eric R.
Dinallo alleged that while Merrill Lynch publicly rated companies
"buy" or "accumulate," their research analysts were internally
disparaging those same stocks.2 7 In one instance, Merrill Lynch's
head internet stock analyst, Henry Blodget, saw no floor to the
falling stock price of Internet Capital Group, an investment
banking client of the firm.28 Although the recommendation of the
stock to the public remained high, internally Blodget "was
obviously exceptionally and accurately pessimistic... for which he
anticipated a drop of an additional 60 percent.,
29
Mr. Dinallo also described the conflict created by the
compensation scheme for analysts at Merrill Lynch.3" Analysts'
compensation reflected the success of their efforts to bring in
investment banking fees and clients.31 One e-mail uncovered by
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Michael Schroeder, States Divide Up Probes of Analysts, WALL ST. J., May 23,
2002, at A3. Several states divided up investigative responsibilities between their
respective regulatory agencies and attorney general's offices. Id. New York was
responsible for investigating Merrill Lynch and Salomon Smith Barney. Id.
27. Eric R. Dinallo, Affidavit in Support of Application for an Order Pursuant to
General Business Law Section 354, at 10-13 (April 2002), at http://www.oag.state.
ny.us/press/2002/apr/MerrillL.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Dinallo
Affidavit].
28. Id. at 11.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 14.
31. Id.
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the Attorney General's investigation lays bare the direct
relationship, as the firm's insiders understood it, between research
analysts' coverage of a company's stock and generating investment
banking clients.32  While discussing a strategy to attract an
investment banking client away from a competitor, a banker stated
to an analyst that "[the firm] should aggressively link coverage
with banking."33
Even Mr. Blodget's time as the head of internet research
was devoted primarily to banking activities and secondarily to
research.34 Hdwever, the pressure on the analysts from the
investment bankers to curry favor from current and future clients
with favorable research began to take its toll.35 In an e-mail, a
seemingly frustrated Blodget wrote that his research team would
"just start calling the stocks.., like we see them, no matter what
the ancillary business consequences [would be]," thus admitting
that their research coverage was not objective, but colored by
investment banking concerns.36
2. Salomon Smith Barney
Allegedly much of the same was occurring within the
research department of one of Merrill Lynch's competitors,
Salomon Smith Barney, a Citigroup subsidiary.37 Salomon Smith
Barney's lead analyst under investigation by the New York
Attorney General was Jack Grubman.38 "At issue for Mr.
Grubman is his dual role helping Salomon Smith Barney win
lucrative securities business from the nation's top telecom outfits
while he was recommending investors snap up shares of these
companies in his role as the firm's top-rated telecom analyst.,
39
32. Dinallo Affidavit, supra note 27, at 15.
33. Id. (citing Merrill Lynch document 05229-30 submitted to the Attorney
General's office during their investigation).
34. Id. (citing Merrill Lynch document 34660-61 which states that Blodgett's
work schedule was devoted to "85% banking, 15% research" in a week).
35. Id. at 19, 20.
36. Id. (citing Merrill Lynch Document 68401-02).





One key difference between Mr. Blodget and Mr. Grubman is that
Mr. Grubman apparently never tried to hide this dual role of
providing stock analysis and attracting investment banking
clients.4°  Nevertheless, New York Attorney General Spitzer
believes he can show, through uncovered e-mails, that Mr.
Grubman's intimate ties with investment banking improperly
influenced his ratings of companies.41
Salomon Smith Barney has paid the NASD $5 million to
settle charges that Mr. Grubman and another analyst, Christine
Gochuico, "materially mis[led]" investors by officially touting the
stock of Winstar Communications Inc., while privately questioning
its value and prospects.42  Notably though, Mr. Grubman
personally fought those NASD charges.43  He argued that his
original research reports contained his honest beliefs about
Winstar." When Winstar's prospects changed, he attempted to
downgrade his rating of Winstar in April 2001, but was prevented
from doing so by Salomon's legal department.45 But, in another
research call about AT&T, several memos between CEO Sandy
Weill and Grubman have surfaced which indicate that Grubman
may have changed his rating to help Weill insure control of
Citigroup in exchange for Weill helping Grubman get his kids into
a prestigious preschool program.46 Mr. Grubman's issues appear
to be moot, as he has agreed to pay a fine of $15 million and be








45. Id. The NASD charges that the investment banking relationship prevented
the issuance of the new report. Mr. Grubman, though, has indicated that he is willing
to talk to investigators about the pressures he felt from investment bankers to help
win clients and deals. Id.
46. See Charles Gasparino, Grubman Boast: AT&T Upgrade Had an Altogether
Different Goal, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2002, at Al; Charles Gasparino, Citigroup
Investigation Now Leads to Door of Elite Nursery School, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2002,
at Al.
47. Charles Gasparino, The Stock-Research Pact: How Settlement Train Kept on
Track, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2002, at Cl [hereinafter Gasparino, Stock-Research
Pact].
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The extensive facts collected by the New York Attorney
General tending to show serious conflicts of interest between
bankers and analysts forced Merrill Lynch to enter into a
settlement with all fifty states in May.48 In an early attempt to
restore investor confidence and avoid extended litigation, Salomon
Smith Barney's chief executive announced that his firm would
voluntarily adopt the reforms mandated in the Merrill Lynch
settlement and in October took a further step by splitting its
research and brokerage houses from investment banking.49
B. Analysis of New Regulations
1. Merrill Lynch Settlement (MLS) and New SRO Regulations
Broadly, the multi-state MLS and the new SRO regulations
are intended to provide disclosure of potential investment banking
conflicts and to relieve pressure placed on analysts by the demands
of investment banking." The MLS was dependent upon the assent
of all other states involved in the investigations and was binding
only on Merrill Lynch.51
i. Original SRO Rules
Under the SRO rules (prior to amendment and after),
disclosure of conflicts of interest must be made when a member
firm recommends the purchase or sale of a security.52 The rules
require the member firm to disclose if it makes a market in the
48. See Gasparino, Merrill Will Pay Fine, supra note 2; see also text
accompanying note 10.
49. Schroeder, supra note 26. Mr. Spitzer's reaction to this news was to confirm
his ongoing investigation into Salomon Smith Barney's practices. Id. Paul Beckett,
Outsider Aims to Restore Citigroup's Luster: Bank Moves to Reduce Its Regulatory
Woes, Separates Operations, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2002, at C1. Citigroup named
Sallie Krawcheck, CEO of Sandford C. Bernstein, as head of the new brokerage-
research house to be named Smith Barney. Id.
50. See Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 10; SEC Research Conflicts, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 34,969. The rules primarily affect NYSE Rule 472 and create NASD Rule
2711. See id. at 34,968 n. 3.
51. Robert Julavits, Will Holdout States Spoil Merrill Pact with N.Y.?, AM.
BANKER., Aug. 29, 2002, at 1.
52. SEC Research Conflicts, 67 Fed. Reg. at 34,969.
[Vol. 7
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recommended security, if it has managed or co-managed a public
offering of the security issuer within the last three years, and if it
has a general financial interest in the recommended security.
5 3
ii. New Disclosure Requirements
The MLS and the new SRO rules mandate the disclosure
on all equity research reports issued by the researcher's firm of any
investment banking compensation received in the past twelve
months or any compensation they are entitled to receive from
covered companies.54 The MLS also requires research reports to
state whether or not Merrill Lynch is or will be seeking investment
banking compensation from a company it covers in its reports.55
The SRO rules go a little further by requiring disclosure in
research reports of any research analyst compensation received
from general investment banking revenue, and after any
recommendation of a stock in a public appearance whether or not
the issuer of the stock recommended is an investment banking
client of the firm.56 The SRO rules also require that research
analysts disclose in public appearances any ownership of stocks by
the firm and/or the analyst.5 If the proposed amendments are
adopted, the definition of public appearance would include "print
media interview[s] ... or the writing of a newspaper article or
other type of public written medium in which [a research analyst]
makes a recommendation" concerning an equity security. 8
Further, the SRO rules require firms to provide investors
with a better understanding of the objectivity and analytical rigor
of a firm's research method in their research reports by defining
the meaning of ratings used and providing that the definitions be
53. Id.
54. See Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 10, at 3; SEC Research Conflicts, 67
Fed. Reg. at 34,969. The SRO rules would require additional disclosure when the
research company managed or co-managed a public offering of a covered company
or expects to receive investment banking compensation from a covered company in
the next three months. Id.
55. See Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 10, at 3.
56. SEC Research Conflicts, 67 Fed. Reg. at 34,969.
57. Id. at 34,970.
58. SRO Proposals, 68 Fed. Reg. at 830-31. The already approved rules include
television appearances in their definitions of public appearance. Id.
2003]
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consistent with the word's plain meaning. 9 Additionally, firms
must provide the percentage of all ratings assigned to their
equivalents of Buy/Hold/Sell categories. 6° Finally, they will be
required to provide a price chart, which maps historical price
movements of securities and "indicates those points at which
ratings or price targets were assigned or changed.",61  Under
Merrill Lynch's settlement terms, it must also provide the
percentages for all stock recommendations it gives, including a
separate analysis of recommendations for its investment banking
clients' stocks.6 2
Besides the administrative expense of compliance, none of
these provisions appear to be very onerous. The primary concern
involves disclosures about future investment banking transactions,
since such disclosures may harm future negotiations, alter
competitive advantages between investment banks, and provide
fodder for investor speculation.63
iii. Compensation Factors
The MLS and the SRO regulations also affect analyst
compensation.64  The MLS requires that the evaluation and
determination of analysts' compensation be completely separate
from investment banking considerations. 6' The new SRO rules
also provide that a research analyst's salary may not be tied to
59. SEC Research Conflicts, 67 Fed. Reg. at 34,970.
60. Id. Firms generally have a low percentage of sell ratings no matter what the
market is doing. See e.g., Dinallo Affidavit, supra note 27, at 9.
61. SEC Research Conflicts, 67 Fed. Reg. at 34,970. This is in response to the
perception that reductions in ratings occur long after the market has declined. See
Dinallo Affidavit, supra note 27, at 10; see also SRO Proposals, 68 Fed. Reg. at 828,
832 (proposing amendments that would require a firm to disclose when it
discontinues coverage of a company).
62. See Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 10, at 4.
63. See SEC Research Conflicts, 67 Fed. Reg. at 34,972-73 (mentioning concerns
by industry commentators on the rules that disclosure of investment banking
relations may "signal" or "tip" the public investor about non-public transactions).
64. See Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 10, at 5-7; SEC Research Conflicts,
67 Fed. Reg. at 34,969. The SRO proposed amendments would adopt compensation
factors similar to those set out in the Merrill Lynch settlement. See SRO Proposals,
68 Fed. Reg. at 828, 832.
65. Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 10, at 5.
[Vol. 7208
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specific investment banking transactions.66 Thus, there should be
no correlation between a research analyst's compensation and the
amount of investment banking compensation received from the
companies covered by the analyst.67 Under the MLS, the extent to
which a research analyst participates in investment banking
transactions, such as solicitations, will not be a factor in
determining analyst compensation.68
The MLS and the proposed amendments to the SRO rules
provide the factors that may be considered in computing analyst
69compensation. In general, analyst compensation may be tied to
those services benefiting their investor clients.7 ° This means that
compensation may be based on the quality of research and
performance of investment recommendations.71 Additionally, the
proposed SRO amendments would require analysts' work
performance and compensation to be reviewed by a compensation
committee that does not include representatives of the firm's
investment banking side.72
Changes affecting compensation may be the key element in
the MLS and the new SRO regulations. Removing the incentive
for analysts to generate investment banking revenues significantly
reduces the incentive for analysts to provide overly optimistic
research reports. Further, the factors that are to be considered
when deciding compensation for analysts are proper. The
compensation scheme puts the analysts' interests in line with the
interests of the investors that rely on their recommendations.
However, given that research does not pay for itself, investment
66. SEC Research Conflicts, 67 Fed. Reg. at 34,969.
67. See Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 10, at 6; SEC Research Conflicts, 67
Fed. Reg. at 34,969.
68. Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 10, at 6. If the SRO amendments are
approved, the compensation of a research analyst may not reflect his or her
contribution to investment banking revenue. SRO Proposals, 68 Fed. Reg. at 828,
832.
69. See Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 10, at 5-7; SRO Proposals, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 828, 832 (proposing compensation factors similar to those set out in the
Merrill Lynch settlement).
70. Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 10, at 5; see also SRO Proposals, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 828, 832.
71. SRO Proposals, 68 Fed. Reg. at 828, 832; see Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra
note 10, at 7.
72. SRO Proposals, 68 Fed. Reg. at 828, 832.
20031 209
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banking revenues must be used in some form to pay for the cost of
research, including analyst compensation.73 Unless analysts have
no idea for whom their bankers are working, the potential conflicts
of interest seem inevitable. Yet, if compensation is rewarded
based on analyst research performance, then even if the money
comes from general investment banking revenue, the analyst
should not get paid unless he first does a good job at picking
stocks.
iv. Restrictions
A major area affected by the MLS terms and the SRO
regulations is communication and interaction between investment
banking departments and research departments. 74  The new
regulations stipulate that a firm's investment banking department
may not supervise any research analysts.7 ' There is to be no
discussion of pending research between researchers and bankers
unless the communication is intermediated by someone from the
legal or compliance staff.76 Finally, there is to be no review of
research reports by a company covered in the report for anything
other than the accuracy of facts.77
The MLS imposes new restrictions on research analyst
participation in the solicitation of investment banking business.78
Research management must approve participation by an analyst.79
The SRO's proposed amendments would go further by prohibiting
an analyst from issuing a report on a company that the analyst
communicated with in an attempt to generate investment banking
business.8° Under both the settlement and the approved SRO
rules, a research analyst or the firm he or she works for may not
offer favorable research as an inducement or as consideration for
73. See Malkiel, supra note 18.
74. See Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 10, at 8-9; SEC Research Conflicts,
67 Fed. Reg. at 34,969.
75. SEC Research Conflicts, 67 Fed. Reg. at 34,969.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 10, at 8-9.
79. Id. at 8.
80. See SRO Proposals, 68 Fed. Reg. at 827, 832.
[Vol. 7210
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
the receipt of investment banking business or compensation.8
And, at least in the MLS, an analyst may not change the
recommendation of a company because of the company's decision
not to hire Merrill Lynch for investment banking services.82
Under the new SRO rules, "quiet periods" will be
instituted during which a firm acting as a manger or co-manager of
an initial offering cannot issue a report "within 40 days after an
initial public offering.., or within 10 days after a secondary
offering of an inactively traded security., 83 Under the proposed
amendments, the restrictions during the "quiet period" would
extend to public appearances by research analysts.84
Significantly, the new rules have placed new restrictions on
analysts' personal trading capabilities.85  A research analyst
governed by SRO regulations "may [not] purchase or receive an
issuer's securities prior to its IPO, if the company engages in a type
of business covered by the analyst., 8 6 No research analyst may
trade stock issued "by companies the analyst follows for the period
beginning 30 days prior to issuance of the research report and
ending five days after the date of report."87 Finally, a research
analyst "may not engage in trading contrary to the analyst's most
recent recommendation.,
88
Some of these new restrictions may be unnecessary. One
service an analyst can certainly provide to his banker colleagues is
the identification of potential clients.89  Monitoring all
81. SEC Research Conflicts, 67 Fed. Reg. at 34,969; see Merrill Lynch Settlement,
supra note 10, at 9.
82. Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 10, at 9.
83. SEC Research Conflicts, 67 Fed. Reg. at 34,969.
84. SRO Proposals, 68 Fed. Reg. at 827-28, 832. Also, the SRO amendments
would prohibit a public appearance or the release of a research report concerning a
company by an investment banking firm for which the firm has acted 'as a manager or
co-manager of a stock offering within fifteen days prior to or after the expiration of a
lock-up agreement that the firm has entered into with the company covered in a
report or public appearance. Id. at 828, 832.




89. Cf. Charles Gasparino & Randall Smith, Citigroup Offers Separate Research
Arm in Settlement Bid, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2002, at C1 (claiming that even with a
splitting of Citigroup's research arm from investment banking, the investment
banking department will most likely employ its own analysts who will not be able to
2003]
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communications between bankers and analysts could be quite
burdensome and inefficient. The disclosure requirements already
put forward would seem to take care of any problems that
discussions between analysts and bankers could create.9"
Disclosure that a relationship exists between a company and the
firm that is analyzing its stock should be a sufficient caveat to
investors.
Rules restricting stock trades and the timing of report
issuances also seem excessive. It is likely that the firm(s) who
manage or co-manage an offering have access to the best
information by which to evaluate a stock, and to deprive the
market of that information in the form of a "quiet period" only
further harms investors who then trade on imperfect or incomplete
information. Restricting analysts' trades so that they comply with
their own recommendations will impose high monitoring costs and
will not truly further the goal for which they were written. Market
conditions change constantly, and once an analyst issues a report,
the report may become instantly dated. Perhaps a less costly and
less restrictive solution would be to simply require disclosure of
analyst trades that run counter to their most recent
recommendations. An investor can weigh this information with all
the other market information available when making investment
decisions.
v. Compliance
Maybe the most burdensome obligation the settlement
imposes on Merrill Lynch, which is absent from the SRO rules, is
the duty to create an in-house research recommendation
committee (RRC).91 The RRC will monitor the performance of
recommendations and analyze them "for objectivity, integrity, and
a rigorous analytical framework."92 Also under the MLS, any
recommendation changes must be approved or ratified by the
publish public reports).
90. See e.g., supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
91. See Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 10, at 7-8.
92. Id. at 7.
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RRC.93 Applications to change a recommendation must be
accompanied by disclosures of any participation by the research
analyst in an investment banking transaction with the subject
company within the last twelve months.94 Any intention to
participate in investment banking solicitations must be disclosed to
the RRC, and, as stated previously, participation in investment
banking business in the last twelve months must be disclosed.95
Furthermore, the RRC is responsible for setting up a system to
monitor electronic communications between investment bankers
and analysts.96 Finally, Merrill Lynch must designate a compliance
monitor whose job will be to ensure it is complying with the
settlement.97
Requiring the creation of the RRC seems redundant. The
RRC only checks to make sure the firm is complying with the
settlement. Is there any doubt that Merrill Lynch would have set
up monitors on their own without the requirement that a separate
committee be created for oversight? Therefore, any added
expense would not be attributable to additional monitoring costs,
but to the creation and maintenance of a separate compliance
vehicle.
vi. SEC Regulation AC
On top of the SRO rules, the SEC has proposed Regulation
AC - Analyst Certification.98 In general, Regulation AC would
require a broker or dealer to include in any research report
prepared by an analyst a prominent statement by the analyst
attesting that the views expressed in the report accurately reflect
the analyst's personal views about the security or issuers, and that
93. Id. at 8.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 10, at 8.
97. See id. at 10-11.
98. See Regulation Analyst Certification, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33, 8119,
34, 46301, 67 Fed. Reg. 51, 510 (proposed Aug. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
242.500-502), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8119.htm (last visited
Feb. 15, 2003) [hereinafter SEC Regulation AC]; see also Deborah Solomon, SEC
Requires Analysts Certify Their Research, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2003, at A2 (noting
that the SEC has now approved this rule).
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the analyst's compensation is not related to the specific
recommendation in the report.99 In the alternative, the analyst
may state that part of his compensation is related to a specific
recommendation.' 0 He or she must then identify the source and
amount of compensation and state that the compensation may
influence his recommendation."°' Furthermore, a broker or dealer
must make the same verifications within thirty days after the
calendar quarter of any public appearances by the analyst in which
the analyst expressed his views regarding securities.'0 2
The purpose of this new regulation, like the new SRO
rules, is to promote the integrity of research reports and restore
investor confidence.0 3 Regulation AC provides an additional
disclosure requirement beyond those required by the SROs and
the MLS." The effect of this regulation will be to make
identification of fraudulent reports with specific analysts easier.0 5
This will help lower the investigative burden when pursuing fraud
claims against broker-dealers or analysts. 0 6 However, given the
SRO rules already proposed and approved, the effect of this extra
certification is to increase firms' compliance costs. 07 One can
argue that the disclosure requirements and prohibitions imposed
by the SRO rules -have the same effect of lowering the
investigative burden by simply requiring analysts to sign their
research reports. In essence, instead of making a separate
certification and filing with the SEC, the analyst would sign his or
her report, and the signature would serve as certification that the
99. SEC Regulation AC, supra note 98, at 51,510.
100. Id. at 51,511.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. SEC Regulation AC, supra note 98, at 51,510; SEC Research Conflicts, 67
Fed. Reg. at 34,970.
104. SEC Regulation AC, supra note 98. In fact, the SEC's Regulation AC not
only adds a further disclosure requirement for research reports on equity securities,
but also requires certification of research reports covering debt securities. Id. at
51,512.
105. See Solomon, supra note 98.
106. Id.
107. But see SEC Regulation AC, supra note 98, at 51,513-515 (stating that the
"costs should not be significant," and estimating those costs to "result in a total
annual time burden of approximately 11,296 hours.., and a total annual cost in
dollars of approximately $1,372,464 ... [so as to comply with Regulation AC]").
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report was an honest reflection of his or her personal views. If any
allegations of fraud arose in connection with a report, the SEC
could simply turn to the research report itself to find the analyst,
and use the signature as proof that the analyst was attesting to the
veracity of his or her views expressed in the report.
2. Wall Street Global Pact
The Global Pact (GP) is a preliminary agreement between
regulators and at least ten Wall Street firms requiring the firms to
pay a total of $900 million in retrospective relief to investors, $450
million to fund independent securities research, and $85 million
for investor education.' °8 The regulators and firms have not
entered into a final settlement, but agreement has been reached on
several major provisions that will alter the structure of the
investment banking industry. 9
The first major provision will sever research analysts from
investment banking pressures.11 This will likely look very similar
to the already adopted SRO rules, as well as the MLS terms." 1 A
few provisions seem to be new or stricter than terms in the MLS
and SRO regulations. For example, the GP will include an
outright ban on analysts attending sales pitches for investment
banking deals and Wall Street road shows where potential clients
make pitches to big investors.12  Moreover, the agreement will
108. See Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2002-179 (Dec.
20, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-179.htm (last visited Feb. 15,
2003)[hereinafter SEC Global Pact]. The firms involved so far are Bear Stearns,
Credit Suisse First Boston, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan Chase,
Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch (a total of $200 million more), Morgan Stanley,
Salomon Smith Barney and UBS Warburg. Id. Noticeably absent from this group
are any affiliates of Wachovia or Bank of America. Id.
109. See Smith, Regulators Set Accord, supra note 15. Details of the settlement
will be released in January 2003 at the earliest, and may eventually serve as an
industry wide model. Id.
110. SEC Global Pact, supra note 108.
111. See Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 10; SEC Research Conflicts, 67 Fed.
Reg. 34, 968.
112. Smith, Regulators Set Accord, supra note 15. Research analysts' attendance
at these pitches would also be prohibited by the proposed SRO amendments. SRO
Proposals, 68 Fed. Reg. at 827, 832-33, 835. However, due diligence communications
would not be prohibited whereby the analysts are merely communicating to "analyze
the financial condition and business operations of the subject company." Id.
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require firms' research groups to be physically separated from
their investment banking departments, with their own legal and
compliance departments that do not report to investment
banking.113 However, upon request, analysts will be allowed to
give their opinions to investment bankers about potential
transactions, in a process called vetting.'14
Significantly, the research houses will have to buy
independent research from independent researchers, which will be
made available to the firms' investor clients.' 5 Regulators will
appoint a monitor for each brokerage house who will be
responsible for buying the independent research." 6 The monitor
will have to choose at least three independent research firms to
contract with.' 1 7 The $450 million paid by the parties to the GP
will pay for this system, at least for the next five years."8 What will
happen after five years is uncertain."9
Also, the GP requires the brokerage houses to disclose
analyst recommendations in order to allow the public to evaluate
and compare the performance of analysts. This disclosure will
include analysts' ratings and price target forecasts.'2 ° And, as
noted above, the GP completely bans the practice of spinning.12 '
Analysis of the GP before it is finalized is guesswork.
However, it is fair to say that the major provisions agreed to and
made public so far will impose significant structural change to the
way investment banking is done on Wall Street. Though the
overall goal of ensuring objective analysis is laudable, it is far from
clear that the goal will be achieved. As predicted, private claims
have been filed against these Wall Street firms, and any relief their
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Susanne Craig, Independent Research May Not Necessarily Mean Better





120. SEC Global Pact supra note 108.
121. Id; see also supra text accompanying note 17.
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embattled stocks felt upon the announcement of the GP may be
short-lived. 112
C. Prior Regulation
The creation of new laws and rules raises the inference that
the old laws were inadequate. However, recent legal action taken
by New York's Attorney General Eliot Spitzer and the NASD
against Wall Street firms indicates the contrary; the old laws are
adequate tools to punish the alleged wrongdoings of the securities
industry.
1 23
1. New York's Martin Act
In taking action against Merrill Lynch, Eliot Spitzer
employed New York's Martin Act. 124 New York's Martin Act is
considered the most stringent securities law in the nation, tougher
even than the federal regulation. 125 Under the statute, prosecutors
"do not even have to show scienter, or that perpetrators willfully
or knowingly did something illegal, as required under federal law.
[a]ll they need to show is that the defendant committed an
intentional act constituting fraud."
' 126
New York case law states that the Martin Act is a remedial
statute rather than just a criminal statute and should, therefore, be
liberally applied.1 27 To that end, words like fraud have been given
a broad meaning that include all acts, even those that do not
originate from an evil design to perpetuate a fraud or injury on
122. See Smith, Regulators Set Accord, supra note 15; Susanne Craig, Wall Street
Braces for Bad-Research Claims, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2003, at C1 [hereinafter Craig,
Wall Street Braces].
123. See Gasparino, Merrill Will Pay Fine, supra note 2; Smith & Anand supra
note 4; Gasparino, Salomon Settles Case, supra note 14.
124. See N.Y. C.L.S Gen. Bus. Article 23-A; see also Gasparino, Merrill Will Pay
Fine, supra note 2; Jerry Markon & Charles Gasparino, For Corporate-Crime
Fighters, No Law is Old, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2002, at C1.
125. Tamara Loomis, Martin Act: New York Securities Statute Gives Spitzer Clout,
N.Y. L. J., May 9, 2002, Vol. 227, at 5.
126. Id; see also State v. Rachmani Corp., 525 N.E.2d 704, 708 (N.Y. 1988).
127. People v. Wachtell, 47 N.Y.S.2d 945, 946 (1943). See also CPC Int'l, Inc. v.
McKesson Corp., 514 N.E.2d 116, 118 (N.Y. 1987) (implied private right of action is
inconsistent with statutory scheme).
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another, which by their nature deceive or mislead the purchasing
public and which come within the purpose of the Martin Act.1 28 So
far, this has been enough for Eliot Spitzer's purposes to attack
what he considers fraudulent practices occurring in the New York
securities industry.' 29 The quick Merrill Lynch settlement and the
yet-to-be defined Global Pact shows the effectiveness of this law. 3°
2. NASD Conduct Rules 2110 and 2120
Moreover, the necessity of new rules, at least for NASD
members, seems hard to understand in light of the recent
settlement the NASD reached with Salomon Smith Barney
regarding Winstar's stock.'3' Salomon paid a fine based on charges
that its analyst, Jack Grubman, made misleading statements and
omissions regarding Winstar stock, which had the effect of
violating just and equitable principles of trade. 3 2  The NASD
apparently did not proceed against Salomon for violations of
NASD Conduct Rule 2210 governing communications with the
public, but instead charged Salomon with violations of Rule 2110,
which sets forth the standards of commercial honor and principles
of trade. 1
33
Rule 2110 is a general proscription against inequitable
practices. 34  It states that "[a] member, in the conduct of his
business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor and
128. People v. Federated Radio Corp., 154 N.E. 655, 657 (N.Y. 1926). The
purpose of the Martin Act is to prevent all kinds of fraud in connection with the sale
or purchase of securities and to defeat schemes that fraudulently exploit the public.
Id.
129. Gasparino, Merrill Will Pay Fine, supra note 2.
130. Id. Merrill Lynch did not admit wrongdoing as part of the settlement, but still
felt compelled to acquiesce to the New York Attorney General's demands. Id. See
also Gasparino, Stock-Research Pact, supra note 47 (noting that the SEC's Harvey
Pitt may have initially backed off investigations, only to reopen them in an attempt to
protect the SEC's turf from encroachment by New York's Martin Act, thereby
underscoring the laws pervasive reach).
131. Gasparino, Salomon Settles Case, supra note 14. See also Smith & Anand
supra note 4.
132. Gasparino, Salomon Settles Case, supra note 14.
133. See id.; Conduct Rules 2110, 2210, N.A.S.D. Manual (CCH) 4111, 4171-4180
(2002), available at http://www.nasdr.com/nasd-manual.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2003)
[hereinafter NASD Manual].
134. Conduct Rule 2110, NASD Manual, supra note 133, at 4111.
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just and equitable principles of trade."'' 35 Moreover, NASD Rule
2120 states that "[n]o member shall effect any transaction in, or
induce the purchase or sale of, any security by means of any
manipulative, deceptive or other fraudulent device or
contrivance."'' 36 Reading these two rules together, a strong case
could be made that research reports and recommendations that
were overly optimistic without any basis in objectivity or even in
flat contradiction to objective realities were fraudulent and
deceptive. The NASD would likely argue that the reports and
recommendations were in fact sales pitches intended to induce
clients and the investing public to purchase the securities of
member firms' investment banking clients. Therefore, member
firms' actions violated Rule 2120 expressly, and did not comport to
the "high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable
principles of trade."' 37  Salomon did not admit to wrongdoing
when it agreed to settle for $5 million, but a settlement was worth
that much to Salomon to keep the NASD from finding any
potential rule violation.
138
3. SEC Rule 10(b)-5
At the federal level, sections 9 and 10 of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) attempt to prohibit manipulation of
securities. 3 9 SEA section 10(b) provides that it is illegal for one to
use, in connection with the purchase and/or sale of securities, any
manipulative or deceptive device in contravention of rules or
regulations that the SEC may issue for the public interest or
investor protection.4 ° This is a broad rule, but it applies only to
those manipulations that are in violation of a rule already
promulgated. 4' Yet, Rule 10(b)-5 appears to apply to the present
135. Id.
136. Conduct Rule 2120, NASD Manual, supra note 133, at 4127.
137. Conduct Rules 2110, 2120, NASD Manual, supra note 133, at 4111, 4127.
138. Gasparino, Salomon Settles Case, supra note 14.
139. THOMAS HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.1 (4th ed. 2002).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2002).
141. Id.
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activities under consideration by the NASD and SEC.14 2
Significantly, it states that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person... (a) to
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statement made.., not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
4 3
There are several distinct elements that must be present to
find a violation of 10(b)-5.' For the situations discussed in this
Note, the device employed would be the research reports
distributed by the firms of the research analysts and/or any other
communications made by them via e-mail, radio, or television.
One would first have to show that the act in question met the
materiality threshold.'45 Were there misstatements or omissions of
material facts such that "the omitted fact would have assumed
actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable
shareholder .... [or would have] significantly altered the 'total
mix' of information made available[?]"' 46  One could certainly
argue that a failure to disclose the nature of the research analyst's
relationship to a covered company could be an omission of a
material fact.'47 For instance, if a research analyst himself or his
142. See Letter from Joseph S. Borg, President, North American Securities
Administration Association, Inc., to Barbara Z. Sweeney, Corporate Secretary,
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (September 23, 2002), at
http://www.nasaa.org/nasaa/Files[File-Uploads/NASDIPO.37523-63215.pdf (last
visited Feb. 15, 2003). President Borg mentions this rule in his response to the
proposed NASD rules. Id.
143. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002).
144. HAZEN, supra note 139 at § 12.4.
145. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (holding that for a
violation of Commission Rule 14a-9 to be found, a material omission or misstatement
must be shown); Basic, Inc., v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (applying the TSC
Industries materiality test to Rule 10b-5).
146. TSC Industries, Inc., 426 U.S. at 449.
147. See Gasparino, Salomon Settles Case, supra note 14. The action against
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firm has a substantial financial interest in a company, an investor
who was not given notice of this relationship would have every
reason to believe that the stock recommendation was objective.
Also, for an analyst to omit the fact that he or she thinks a stock is
worthless, and then maintain a buy rating for retail investors to
employ when considering their own purchases and sales, would
appear to significantly factor into the "total mix" of information
available.'48 The purpose of speaking out of both sides of your
mouth is to produce positive stock demand, pushing up the price.
As a reward for providing positive research, the analyst's firm is
awarded further investment banking fees from the positively
covered company. The deception or fraud lies in the non-
disclosure of these relationships.14 9
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,5 ' the Supreme
Court held that the plaintiff class for private actions under Rule
10b-5 was limited to actual purchasers and sellers of securities.
1 5'
Furthermore, for actions by the SEC under 10b-5, the "in
connection with" requirement is met even when the underlying act
is not the manipulation of securities but the stealing of assets.'52
Under these standards, there is no question that the actions of the
research analysts would be in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities. The research reports were intended for investors to
use in making decisions to purchase or sell securities.
Proving scienter would be the most highly contested
element of potential 10b-5 violations. In Ernst & Ernst v.
Salomon in regards to its rating of Winstar was based on the presence of materially
misleading statements. Id.
148. TSC Industries, Inc., 426 U.S. at 449. See also supra text accompanying notes
28-29.
149. Accord Craig, Wall Street Braces, supra note 122 (indicating that plaintiff's
attorneys will not argue investors were hurt by poor stock recommendations, but
instead were harmed because the firms did not disclose to investors that their analysts
were attempting to win investment banking fees with their research reports).
150. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) Plaintiff alleged
that he did not purchase securities because materially misleading statements in the
company's offering material were designed to discourage purchases. Id.
151. Id. at 730-31.
152. SEC v. Zanford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002). Defendant broker misappropriated to
himself a client's assets, using an account over which the broker had investment
control. Id.
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Hochfelder,153 the Supreme Court found that in a private cause of
action there must be a "knowing and intentional misconduct" to
find a violation of 10b-5. 54 In Aaron v. SEC,115 the Supreme Court
further found that the same scienter requirement imposed on
private actions is also necessary to find a violation of 10(b)-5 in
actions for injunctive relief brought by the SEC.
156
Any move against the Wall Street firms would require
proof of intentional misconduct that would tend to deceive
investors.'57  With pressure from the investment bankers, the
analysts intended to provide positive research on firms. They
meant for positive research to fall on investors' ears, who would
then buy the stock and push stock prices up. If that happened,
then the accuracy of their reports did not matter because they had
satisfied their investment banking clients, and consequently their
own firm, with positive stock movement. The admissions in e-
mails sent by Henry Blodget and Jack Grubman evince an
understanding of what they were doing. 158 They knew they were
being pressured into recommendations that had no basis in reality,
and they knew the potential effects their recommendations could
have on the stock market. 159  They may have expressed some
misgivings about providing optimistic reports, but they did it
anyway. 61 One could certainly argue that this adds up to knowing
and intentional misconduct, satisfying the scienter requirement of
153. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). The Court found that the
accounting firm of Ernst & Ernst, though possibly negligent, did not act with an
intent to deceive shareholders as auditors for First Securities (a firm running a
fraudulent scam), and therefore could not be held liable for a violation of rule 10b-5.
Id.
154. Id., at 197-99.
155. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). Defendant had been informed of
fraudulent activities engaged in by some of his employees, but he failed to take any
action against them. Id. The SEC filed actions to enjoin him from the sale of
securities in the future. Id.
156. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 690-91.
157. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197-99; Aaron, 446 U.S. at 690-91.
158. See Dinallo Affidavit supra note 27, at 19, 20; Gasparino, Spitzer Gathers
Emails, supra note 6. However, Jack Grubman still maintains that he truly believed
in the telecom industry and has not backed down from that view. Id. Therefore,
proving scienter in his case may be more difficult. Id.
159. See also supra text accompanying notes 28, 29, and 39.
160. See Dinallo Affidavit supra note 27, at 19, 20; Gasparino, Spitzer Gathers
Emails, supra note 6.
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10b-5. With their stock recommendations, analysts intended to
deceive investors into buying questionable securities.
Next, a successful action against these analysts would
require proof of the deception.161 In Santa Fe Industries v. Green,
the Supreme Court said that an allegation of fraud under Rule
10b-5 required an element of deception or concealment of material
information. 162  This element was found lacking in that case
because the plaintiffs were given all the relevant information to
make a decision regarding their shares in Santa Fe.
163
Nondisclosure and deception are present, however, in the research
reports issued by many Wall Street firms."6 As revealed in the
current investigations, analysts sometimes intentionally withhold
their true feelings about a stock, particularly when their personal
opinion is at odds with their firm's investment banking interests.
4. Securities Act of 1933 Section 17
In the 1933 Securities Act, section 17(a) provides a general
proscription against fraud during the offer or sale of a new security
that looks almost identical to the language in section 10 of the 1934
Securities and Exchange Act. 165  Specifically, section 17(b)
prohibits a person from describing a stock, for instance, through a
recommendation, "for consideration received or to be received,
directly or indirectly, from an issuer, underwriter, or dealer,
without fully disclosing the receipt, whether past or prospective, of
such consideration and the amount thereof.' ' 166 Analysts would
argue they receive no consideration for covering stocks, but
empirical evidence may suggest otherwise, even if the
consideration is indirect. If section 17(b) were read to cover the
relationship between investment banking and research, another
161. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (action by minority
shareholders alleging fraud in the proposal of a short form merger).
162. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 474-76.
163. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 474-76.
164. Cf. SEC Research Conflicts, 67 Fed. Reg. at 34,969 (a main purpose of the
new regulations is to increase disclosure).
165. Fraudulent Interstate Transactions, 15 U.S.C. 77q (2002) (The 1933 Securities
Act applies to public offerings, initial or otherwise).
166. Id. at 77q(b).
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federal law, effective since the genesis of federal securities
regulation, would prohibit much that is dealt with in the MLS and
the SRO rules.
Why then has the SEC failed to proceed against these firms
under rule 10b-5 or section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933?167
The answer remains unclear. The facts available to them seem to
be sufficient to prove violations of Rule lOb-5. Instead, the SEC
has promulgated new regulations and will impose substantial
structural changes to the securities industry through the new rules.
Providing stricter rules may indeed have the effect of restoring
investor confidence, but enforcement of the present rules could do
the same.
168
II. IPO ALLOCATION CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
A. Recent Practices
The IPO allocation investigation is an extension of the
investigation into research conflicts.1 69  The allegation by the
regulatory and enforcement agencies is that investment banks
allocated hot IPOs, which in the bubble years were almost
guaranteed to reap instant profits, to officers and directors of their
client companies in exchange for their continued investment
banking relationships. 70  The banks profited through the
continued fees they received, and in return the officers and
directors of their clients reaped huge personal gains.7 The
167. Private rights of action under 10b-5 further require the proof of elements of
causation and reliance. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Basic
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). See also Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int'l
Holdings, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1776 (2001) (holding that even an oral agreement for the
sale of an options contract with the hidden intent not to honor the contract was a
violation of Rule 10b-5).
168. See also Letter from Joseph S. Borg, President, North American Securities
Administration Association, Inc., to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (September 23, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s73002/jborgl.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2003). President Borg criticizes the new
Regulation AC as implying that under pre-Regulation AC standards analysts were
subject to a lesser standard of truthfulness. He fears the creation of new standard
instead of the clarification of the old standard. Id.
169. See also supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
170. See also supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
171. See Smith & Pulliam, Buddy System, supra note 8; Smith & Pulliam, Star
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executives received the shares at low prices and then sold at high
prices to investors who, because they were sometimes misled by
the overly optimistic research reports, created high demand, which
caused stock prices to soar. v2  By the time the small investor
realized the company had little prospect for future profitability, he
or she had paid dearly for a stock that, in most instances, had
nowhere to go but down.'
1. Salomon Smith Barney
The initial query into IPO allocation practices came from
two members of the House Financial Services Committee,
Pennsylvania Democrat Paul Kanjorski and Connecticut
Republican Christopher Shays, after hearing testimony from Jack
Grubman on July 8, 2002 regarding the tremendous earnings
overstatements made by WorldCom.'74 Specifically, they wanted
to know who at WorldCom was allocated IPO shares by Salomon
Smith Barney's brokerage house over recent years. 75 The concern
grew out of both Salomon's role as WorldCom's lead investment
banker and Mr. Grubman's continued support of the stock during
its rapid decline.
176
WorldCom's CEO Bernard Ebbers and others profited
substantially from allocations of IPOs to their accounts. 177  Mr.
Ebbers made $11 million over a four-year period trading IPOs.
7 8
A cursory look at the situation seems to indicate that there was a
quid pro quo involved. WorldCom would use Salomon Smith
Barney for investment banking services in exchange for allocations
Banker, supra note 9.
172. See Smith & Pulliam, Buddy System, supra note 8; Smith & Pulliam, Star
Banker, supra note 9.
173. Gasparino, Craig & Smith supra note 7. For instance, Rhythms
NetConnections' stock rose 229% on its first day of trading in 1999, peaking at 431%
above its initial price a week later, but quickly ran into financial trouble when the




177. Susan Pulliam, Randall Smith, & Michael Schroeder, SEC May Punish Some
Executives Who Snared IPOs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2002 at C1.
178. Id.
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of hot IPOs, benefiting WorldCom directors and officers, as well
as Salomon.179 To date, the New York Attorney General has only
instituted an action against the executives that benefited from the
Salomon allocations.'8 ° No action has yet been instituted against
Salomon for its role in this potentially illegal activity.'81
2. Credit Suisse First Boston
Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB), an arm of the Credit
Suisse Group, had already settled a lawsuit regarding some of its
IPO practices when a further investigation was launched. 8 2 In
January 2002, CSFB paid $100 million to settle SEC and NASD
charges for "improperly shar[ing] IPO profits with [hedge-fund]
trading customers."' 83 The hedge funds were profiting by quickly
selling ("flipping") newly offered stock and sharing the profits with
CSFB in the form of high brokerage commissions for the
allocation of the IPO shares.'84
The investigations focused on the activities of one of
CSFB's top technology investment bankers, Frank Quattrone.'
85
Allegedly, brokers who worked with Mr. Quattrone oversaw
accounts for his investment banking clients.'86 Generally, a client
could open what were known as "Friends of Frank" accounts after
they had selected CSFB to underwrite their company's stock
offerings or conduct banking transactions.'87 Several released e-
mails indicate that Mr. Quattrone sought higher percentages of
179. Gasparino, Craig, & Smith supra note 7.
180. Charles Gasparino, New York Sues Telecom Executives Over Stock Profits,
WALL ST. J., October 1, 2002, at Al [hereinafter Gasparino, New York Sues Execs].
181. See id.
182. Smith & Pulliam, Star Banker, supra note 9.
183. Id.
184. Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam, IPO 'Rogue' Battles to Clear His Name,
WALL ST. J., September 17, 2002, at C1 [hereinafter Smith & Pulliam, IPO 'Rogue'
Battles]. Flipping is the selling of securities almost immediately after being allocated
the shares at the initial public offering. The NASD and SEC noted that the brokers,
in some instances, charged commissions of 65% as pay back for IPO profits. Id.





IPOs for the brokers working with his investment banking
clients.'88
Currently, no smoking gun has been found that indicates
the CSFB IPO allocations were done in exchange for further
investment banking business.'89 In 1997, Mr. Quattrone publicly
derided the practice of spinning IPOs to client executives in return
for investment banking business.' 90 Thus far, CSFB's response to
this allegation is that the "Friends of Frank" accounts were offered
to officers and directors of companies who were already
investment banking clients, not as an inducement to start an
investment banking relationship.' 9' Also, at least some of the
individual clients state that they did not feel the accounts and IPO
allocations were a kickback for banking business.9 2 Furthermore,
allocations among the accounts were apparently distributed
uniformly, not in proportion to investment banking business.' 93
3. Goldman Sachs
Finally, congressional investigators contend that Goldman
Sachs participated in the practice of spinning hot IPO stocks to
corporate executives in exchange for investment banking
business.' 94 IPOs were distributed to the personal accounts of
executives from Goldman investment banking clients such as
Yahoo, eBay, WorldCom, Enron, eToys, and Global Crossing.1
95
In all, executives from twenty-one companies with investment
188. Id.
189. Id. But see Charles Gasparino, Key Player in the Tech-Stock Boom, Frank
Quattrone, Faces NASD Action, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2003, at C1 (Mr. Quattrone has
been served by the NASD with a Wells notice, charging him with improper 'spinning'
and failing to supervise CSFB's technology-stock analysts. The Wells notice gives
Mr. Quattrone a chance to rebut the allegations before the NASD decides to take
action).
190. Smith & Pulliam, Star Banker, supra note 9. Mr. Quattrone spoke out against
spinning IPOs in a Wall Street Journal article covering the topic in 1997. Id.
191. Id.
192. Smith & Pulliam, Buddy System, supra note 8.
193. See Smith & Pulliam, Star Banker, supra note 9.
194. Randall Smith, Goldman Gave Hot IPO Shares to Top Executives of Its
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banking relationships with Goldman received IPO shares in their
personal accounts.'96 Goldman responded to the investigation by
asserting that there was no preferential treatment given to the
corporate executives over other clients, and noting that unlike
practices at other firms where IPOs were automatically allocated
to certain accounts, their clients had to place orders to get IPOs.
197
B. Recent Regulation Proposals
1. NASD Rule 2710 Proposed Amendment and
Proposed Rule 2712
In its Notice to Members 02-55, the NASD has enumerated
certain activities that it thinks should subject a firm to disciplinary
actions by the NASD.' 98 New Rule 2712 would first prohibit
members from allocating IPOs as consideration for excessive
compensation for other services provided by the member. 99 This
seems intended to prohibit investment banks from sharing in IPO
profits by charging excessive commissions to the brokerage houses
who receive part of the IPO allocation, such as the profit sharing
activities that occurred between CSFB and hedge funds. 2°° In this
case, the service that CSFB provided to the hedge funds was access
to the IPOs themselves.2 0 ' Interestingly, the NASD was able to
settle with CSFB for $100 million even without this rule.0 2
Second, the proposed rule would prohibit the person
allocating IPOs from demanding or requesting that the receiver of
the IPOs purchase more shares in the aftermarket (after the initial
offering) as a condition of being allocated IPO shares in the first
place. 203 The intent of an arrangement like this would be to keep
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. NASD NM 02-55, supra note 17.
199. Id.
200. See Smith & Pulliam, Star Banker, supra note 9; Smith & Pulliam, IPO
'Rogue' Battles, supra note 184.
201. See Smith & Pulliam, Star Banker, supra note 9; Smith & Pulliam, IPO
'Rogue' Battles, supra note 184.
202. See Gasparino, Salomon Settles Case, supra note 14; Smith & Pulliam, Star
Banker, supra note 9; Smith & Pulliam, IPO 'Rogue' Battles, supra note 184.
203. NASD NM 02-55, supra note 17.
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the demand high by forcing the customer to buy in the aftermarket
in exchange for the chance to make substantial profits from the
allocation of IPOs. 2°4 This type of arrangement would benefit the
"buzz" surrounding the stock and thus appease the issuer.0 5
The third proposed provision would expressly prohibit
spinning.26 A member could not allocate IPO shares to executives
of a company on the condition that the executive use his power to
direct future investment banking business to the member, nor
could a member allocate IPO shares to an executive in return for
prior investment banking business.2 7
Fourth, 2712 would forbid members from penalizing
registered representatives whose customers sell their IPO shares
within thirty days of the initial offering date (known as
"flipping"). 20 ' A member could not do this unless the underwriter
could "reclaim a selling concession from a syndicate member in
connection with an offering when the securities originally sold by
the syndicate member are purchased in syndicate covering
transactions. ' , 2 9 This proposal apparently says that a member can
not prohibit another from engaging in a certain activity and then
turn around and engage in that activity itself; a member cannot
prohibit flipping if it is engaged in flipping itself.210 Also, 2712
requires NASD member firms to take steps necessary to
implement these prohibitions and ensure they are being
followed.21'
Finally, the NASD has proposed an amendment to rule
2710 that would require members to disclose whether any officer
or director of a company with a business relationship to the
allocating firm acquired IPO shares from their company's
investment banking firm.212 If so, the member must disclose,
204. See id.
205. See id; see also Michael Casey, Dot-Corn IPO Pricing Baffles Economists,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2002, at A2.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id; see also supra text accompanying note 184.
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among other things, who acquired the shares, how many shares
were purchased, when the director received the shares, and the
price paid for them." 3
C. Present Regulation
Again, working from the premise that the creation of new
laws or regulations suggests that the old regime is inadequate, one
must ask what gap the new NASD rules and the Global Settlement
on spinning would fill.
1. New York's Martin Act
Recently, Eliot Spitzer sued several company executives for
profiting from the allocation of IPO shares, which he says were in
exchange for directing investment business back to the
underwriting bank."4 In this action, Mr. Spitzer has employed the
same weapon he used to force Merrill Lynch into the research
analyst settlement, the New York Martin Act.2"5 The Attorney
General alleges that executives were unjustly enriched because
they were allocated hot IPOs without disclosing their relationship
to the underwriting firms distributing the stocks.216 To disgorge
the executives' profits under the Martin Act, Mr. Spitzer must
show fraud on their part."7 Many believe that fraud will be
difficult to prove, even in the absence of the scienter
requirement." 8
Assuming that Mr. Spitzer could succeed in this course of
action, how could he explain his decision not to sue the investment
banking houses also?. 9 If fraud was present in these transactions,
213. Id.
214. Gasparino, New York Sues Execs, supra note 180.
215. Barbara A. Rehm, Alissa Schmelkin, & Michele Heller, Flashpoints, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 27, 2002, at 4.
216. See Gasparino, New York Sues Execs, supra note 180; Richard Schmitt &
Jerry Markon, Wall Street Enforcers Uphold Giuliani Model, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23,
2002, at C1.
217. See Schmitt & Markon, supra note 216.
218. Id.
219. See Gasparino, New York Sues Execs, supra note 180. In fact, Mr. Spitzer
alleges that the activity was beneficial for Salomon as well in the form of investment
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the investment banking firms, because they were the underwriters
handing out the securities, would necessarily have to be complicit
in the fraud and thus the unjust enrichment of the company
220executives.
2. NASD Conduct Rules 2110, 2120, and 2170
Presently, the SRO rules that govern the allocation of IPOs
are NASD Conduct Rules 2110, 2120, and 2710. As stated
previously, Rule 2110 requires the observance of high standards of
commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade.22' As
interpreted by the NASD in Interpretive Memorandum-2110-1,
this rule
is based upon the premise that members have an
obligation to make a bona fide public distribution at
the public offering price of securities of a public
offering which trade at a premium in the secondary
market whenever such secondary market begins (a
"hot issue") . . . [t]he failure to make a bona fide
public distribution when there is a demand for an
issue can be a factor in artificially raising the price.
Thus, the failure to do so, especially when the
member may have information relating to the
demand for the securities or other factors not
generally known to the public, is inconsistent with
the high standards of commercial honor and just
and equitable principles of trade and leads to an
impairment of public confidence in the fairness of
the investment banking and securities business.
Such conduct is, therefore, in violation of Rule
2110,222
banking fees from WorldCom. Id.
220. Id.
221. Conduct Rule 2110, NASD Manual, supra note 133, at 4111.
222. IM 2110-1(a)(1) "Free-Riding and Withholding," NASD Manual, supra note
133, at 4112 (emphasis added).
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Section (b) sets out a list of actions that are in violation of Rule
2110. That list does not include the specific activities under review
in this Note, but the language of section (b) does not indicate that
the enumerated activities are exhaustive.2 3
Conduct Rule 2120, again, is a prohibition against the use
of any manipulative, deceptive or fraudulent device, which would
induce the sale or purchase of a security.224 And Conduct Rule
2710 is the Corporate Financing Rule, which sets out allowable
underwriting terms and arrangements. Applicable to the present
discussion are the terms set out in 2710(c)(1), stating:
No member [of NASD] or person associated with a
member shall participate in any manner in any
public offering of securities in which the
underwriting or other terms or arrangements in
connection with or relating to the distribution of the
securities, or the terms and conditions related
thereto, are unfair or unreasonable.225
Together, these three provisions contain broad language
that proscribes unfair or inequitable activities that could apply to
initial stock offerings.226 A member will be in violation of Rule
2110 when it fails to make a bona fide public distribution and
retains information relating to the demand for the security or
other factors the public would not be expected to know. 227 Are
IPOs bona fide when the underwriter allocates substantial shares
to the directors and officers of its investment banking clients? The
answer will depend on intent.
223. IM-2110-1(b), NASD Manual, supra note 133, at 4112-15. After substantially
restating IM-2110-1(a)(1), it states "[t]herefore, it shall be a violation of Rule 2110
for a member, or person associated with a member, to [engage in activities listed]."
Id.
224. Conduct Rule 2120, NASD Manual, supra note 133, at 4127.
225. Conduct Rule 2710(c)(1), NASD Manual, supra note 133, at 4506-07
(emphasis added).
226. IM-2110-1(a)(1), NASD Manual, supra note 133, at 4112; Conduct Rule
2710(c)(1), NASD Manual, supra note 133, at 4506-07.
227. Conduct Rule 2110, NASD Manual, supra note 133, at 4111; IM-2110-1(a)(1),
NASD Manual, supra note 133, at 4112.
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The member-underwriter's argument will be that IPO
allocations to corporate executives are not directly related to any
investment banking business they may bring to the member firm.228
Members say, and perhaps rightly so, that the executives also
happen to be good individual clients.229 Giving them the first shot
at IPOs is merely a way of rewarding them for being lucrative
individual clients for the member's brokerage house.23 ° Standing
alone, this would not violate any of the applicable NASD rules.23'
A bystander may not think it is fair because they have access to
limited IPO stock, but it would not violate commercial honor or
principles of equity in trade.232
However, when one combines IPO allocation practices with
overly optimistic (or blatantly misleading) research reports, the
plausibility that violations of NASD Conduct Rules occurred
increases.233 Under a cynical view, IPO allocations can be seen as
a bonus generated by the underlying analyst scheme, which in turn
is fueled by the investment bankers. 234 The misleading research
reports are manipulative devices under Rule 2120, which induced
the purchasing and selling of certain securities.235 In fact, the
reports created artificial demand at the IPO stage, raising the stock
price in the aftermarket exorbitantly. 2 6 Handing these "hot issue"
IPOs to favored corporate executives (i.e. those who also
participated in investment banking transactions with the member
underwriting the security) in a manipulated and contrived market
created, in part, for the executives' personal benefit cannot
228. See also supra text accompanying notes 191-193, 197 (providing an example in
which at least one bank, CSFB, claimed they considered. the IPO allocations
separately from investment banking interests).
229. See also supra text accompanying notes 191-193, 197; Pulliam, Smith &
Schroeder, supra note 177 (firms argue IPO allocations were given to independently
important brokerage clients).
230. See also supra text accompanying notes 191-193, 197; Pulliam, Smith &
Schroeder, supra note 177.
231. See, e.g., Conduct Rules 2110, 2120, 2710(c)(1), NASD Manual, supra note
133, at 4111, 4127, 4506-07.
232. See Conduct Rule 2110, NASD Manual, supra note 133, at 4111.
233. See, e.g., Conduct Rules 2110, 2120, 2710(c)(1), NASD Manual, supra note
133, at 4111, 4127, 4506-07.
234. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
235. See Conduct Rule 2120, NASD Manual, supra note 133, at 4127.
236. See Craig, Wall Street Braces, supra note 122.
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constitute making a bona fide offering under Rule 2110, and thus
would not meet the high standards of commercial honor and just
and equitable principles required by 21 10.237
3. SEC Regulations
If Wall Street firms violated NASD Conduct Rules, the
same conduct may have also violated Rule 10b-5 or section 17 of
the 1933 Securities Act.238 Again, all the elements that constitute a
violation of 10b-5 must be present for a violation to be found.239
Proving that allocations of IPOs to corporate executives
alone are violations of 10b-5 or section 17 would be hard, if not
impossible.24 ° If there is no connection between the IPOs an
individual client gets and his role as an executive, the arrangement
appears sound.24' Yet, even if the individual client has a
relationship in his or her role as executive, this is not prima facie
evidence of a 10b-5 or section 17 violation.242 To be successful in
arguing that certain IPO practices (namely spinning) are
fraudulent, it would also be necessary to show fraudulent practices
regarding overly optimistic recommendations of stocks.243 The
fraud would be based on the relationship between investment
banking clients and research analysts; the additional element is
that the IPOs are just one part of a quid pro quo scheme in which
company officers direct investment banking business to a bank in
return for personal profits via rosy research reports (section 17(b))
and the IPO stock allocations.244 If one could show that the
research reports and IPO allocations were all part of one
transaction or exchange, a powerful case for finding fraud exists.
For example, an analyst would violate section 17(b) when he or
237. See Conduct Rules, 2110, 2120, supra note 133, at 4111, 4127.
238. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002); 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2002).
239. See supra text accompanying note 144.
240. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfedler, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 228-230.
242. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; 15 U.S.C. § 77q.
243. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; 15 U.S.C. § 77q; see also See Craig, Wall Street Braces,
supra note 122.




she fraudulently recommends a new offering, in exchange for
investment banking business from another issuer.245 The company
executive who receives an IPO allocation of the new offering, even
though it is an offering by another issuer, personally profits from
the high demand created by the fraudulent research report, and
then directs his or her company's investment banking business to
the analyst's firm.246
If the SEC attempted to pursue this angle, a major hurdle
would be proving the IPO allocations were part of the research
scheme and were not offered based on executives' personal
relationships with the Wall Street firms. 247 This evidentiary burden
may be a factor deterring the SEC from instituting a 10b-5 action.
The evidentiary burden may also be a reason why the NASD went
ahead with its proposals. In effect, the NASD is turning a blind
eye to the past, and setting a course for the future. The rules,
however, may provide more confusion than clarity. They appear
to prohibit what is already against the law, and at the same time do
not provide help for the harder cases, namely the CEO who truly
gets IPOs due to his personal account with an investment bank.
4. Possible Common Law Actions
Several alternatives to new regulations and fraud actions
have been proposed.248 One alternative common law action
springs from the corporate opportunity doctrine.249  The idea is
that the executives deprived their corporations of an opportunity
when they did not disclose to their corporations the IPO shares
offered to them.250 Any successful action under this theory would
245. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b); see also supra text accompanying note 166.
246. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b).
247. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 191-193.
248. See, e.g., Pulliam, Smith & Schroeder, supra note 177 (introducing the idea
that executives may have breached the corporate opportunity doctrine); Murray,
supra note 19 (advocating an auction style IPO distribution process); Casey, supra
note 205 (hypothesizing that corporate executives underpriced IPO values, to create
'buzz,' in return for personal profits when the 'buzz' demand sent the stock
skyrocketing).
249. See Pulliam, Smith & Schroeder, supra note 177.
250. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939) President Guth of Loft, Inc.,
through his role as president was offered the opportunity, which he took, to buy
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be based on the fact that the executives gained access to these
IPOs through their roles as corporate officers and not merely as
private high net-worth individuals. 25  Demonstrating this fact
would be difficult. 2  Brokerage firms like to reward their good
clients with things such as IPOs. 253 Perhaps, it just so happens that
many times their high net-worth clients are also officers or
directors of client companies. Plausibly, many times the executive
is sold on opening a personal brokerage account because of his
contact with the bank through his company. On its face, the
genesis of this relationship may appear mischievous. At the same
time, however, from the bank's perspective any contact with an
executive provides a dual opportunity, the chance to provide
financial services to his or her company and the chance to provide
personal financial services to a wealthy individual. Should we
punish a bank for taking that opportunity or an executive for
accepting those services?
During the boom years of the 1990s, did officers and
directors seek to have their company's IPO shares underpriced by
the underwriting firm? 254 And if so, might this constitute a breach
of the fiduciary duty of loyalty owed by officers and directors to
their company? 255  Economists have been unable to fully
understand why so many stocks were underpriced at their IPOs in
the 1990s. 256 One argument is that executives thought that the
"buzz" created by rapid positive price movement on opening day
would help ensure prolonged interest and success. 257 Although this
idea may be contrary to traditional economic theory, which
assumes parties to transactions are rational, an alternative
rights to Pepsi-Cola's name and formula. Id. at 506-07. The court found that buying
rights in Pepsi was an opportunity that inured to the corporation rather than him. Id.
at 511.
251. See id.
252. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 191-193.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 228-230.
254. See Casey, supra note 205. Underpricing is defined as the difference between
the offering and closing prices on the first day of trading. Id.
255. See generally Lincoln Stores, Inc. v. Grant, 34 N.E.2d 704 (Mass. 1941)
(finding that defendants breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty when they acquired
a competing store and began operating it).




"rational" theory may explain it.258  Perhaps executives
underpriced IPO stock in their own company for personal access
to other underpriced, hot IPOs. 25 9  Here the interests of the
executive, as executive, and the corporation may indeed have
diverged, opening up the possibility for actions based on breaches
of fiduciary duties.26' An argument could be made that executives
were being disloyal if they chose particular investment banks with
their own personal profit in mind, rather than choosing the
investment bank that could get the most profit for the corporation
and its shareholders. It seems implausible that an IPO's price was
properly set when first day trading pushes the price up 229
percent, as was the case for Rhythms NetConnections, Inc.261 On
the other hand, the 1990s saw unprecedented activity from the
small investor.262  This had the effect of making it nearly
impossible to set a fair price, because the industries normal
methods for doing so, polling institutional investors and fund
managers, were undercut by the herd mentality that individual
investors exhibited in buying stock.263
D. Analysis of New Proposals
The proposed regulations of IPOs have the advantage of
making certain specific activities illegal. Terms such as fraud,
equity and commercial honor do not always lend themselves to
precise meanings, but this is also their advantage. The terms are
flexible and adaptable to unanticipated situations. In the end, the
proposed rules may restore a bit of investor confidence in the way
IPOs are handled without resorting to a total overhaul of the
system. Yet, the necessity of the proposed rules are extremely




261. Gasparino, Craig, & Smith, supra note 7.
262. See generally Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Business World: A 'Bubble' Is Not a
Crime, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2002, at A19 (speaking of day traders pushing prices
higher in a "self-reinforcing spasm").
263. See generally id. (noting the inherent conflict between running an investment
banking business and servicing the small investor).
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laws of the SEC, NASD, the State of New York, and common law
seem adequate to curb any truly improper activity. In fact,
introducing these new laws may only muddy our understanding of
the laws that govern IPO activities now. Furthermore, the ban on
spinning included in the Global Pact may only serve to remove an
opportunity for banks to develop new individual client
relationships.
III. CONCLUSION
The recent regulatory flurry is a reactionary move. The
stock market crashed, therefore insiders are to blame.2" The new
regulations are attempts to restore investor confidence by giving
the impression that the problem is being addressed.
The current regulatory structure for banking
services in the United States is not the result of any
grand design or reasoned blueprint. Instead, it
represents a set of accumulated responses to a long
history of financial crises, scandals, happenstance,
personalities and compromises among a broad and
competing array of industry and governmental
units."'
The old laws were adequate to deal with abusive conflicts of
interest that marred the integrity of the market. The new
regulations intended to eliminate conflicts of interest among
analysts and IPO allocations are only the latest haphazard
response to our most recent financial crisis.
PHILLIP BALLARD KENNEDY
264. But cf. id. (arguing that investors do not want to analyze their own "role in
the losses" at the busting of the bubble).
265. Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C.
BANKING INST. 221, 221 (2000); see generally JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE AGE OF DERIVATIVES INTO THE NEW
MILLENNIUM (Vol. III 2002) (chronicling the financial industry over the past thirty
years and depicting most regulatory actions as reactions to market crises).
238 [Vol. 7
